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PRECIS 1 
 2 
We examine a cohort of near miss incidents collected from a financial trading 3 
organisation using the Financial Incident Analysis System (FINANS). We reveal that 4 
Situation Awareness and Teamwork skills appear universally important as a ‘last-line’ of 5 
defence for capturing error on the trading floor.  6 
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ABSTRACT 35 
 36 
Objective: i) to determine whether near miss incidents in financial trading contain 37 
information on the operator skills and systems that detect and prevent near misses, and the 38 
patterns and trends revealed by these data and ii) to explore if particular operator skills and 39 
systems are found as important for avoiding particular types of error on the trading floor. 40 
Background: In this study, we examine a cohort of near miss incidents collected 41 
from a financial trading organisation using the Financial Incident Analysis System (FINANS) 42 
and report on the non-technical skills and systems that are used to detect and prevent error in 43 
this domain.  44 
Methods: 1,000 near miss incidents are analysed using distribution, mean, chi-square 45 
and associative analysis to describe the data, reliability is provided. 46 
Results: Slip/lapse (52%) and Human Computer Interface (21%) often occur alone 47 
and are the main contributors to error causation, whereas the prevention of error is largely a 48 
result of teamwork (65%) and situation awareness (46%) skills. No matter the cause of error, 49 
Situation Awareness and Teamwork most often detect and prevent the error.  50 
Conclusion: Situation Awareness and Teamwork skills appear universally important 51 
as a ‘last-line’ of defence for capturing error and data from incident monitoring systems can 52 
be analysed in a fashion more consistent with a safety II approach. 53 
Application: This research provides data for ameliorating risk within financial 54 
trading organisations, with implications for future risk management programmes and 55 
regulation.  56 
 57 
  58 
 3 
INTRODUCTION 59 
Financial trading is an environment where staff are under pressure to take risks, and highly 60 
reliant on complex technical systems to complete their work. Human or system-related errors 61 
lead to ‘operational incidents’: where trading activity results in an avoidable loss (e.g. due to 62 
not assessing risk). Operational incidents place the integrity of the financial organisation at 63 
risk, and careful analysis of the underlying problems and recovery mechanisms are essential 64 
to maintaining organisational performance and long-term integrity. Through adopting 65 
principles used to manage risk in other-high risk domains (e.g. aviation, healthcare), research 66 
in financial trading has identified the factors underlying operational incidents: for example, 67 
teamwork skills, poor system interfaces, and slip/lapses (Leaver and Reader, 2016). These 68 
allow for an analysis of the underlying causes of operational incidents, and where appropriate 69 
remedies for stopping their occurrence on the trading floor (e.g. training, system redesign). 70 
 71 
Yet, the reality of a complex and dynamic industry such as financial trading is that the nature 72 
of risk is likely to evolve, with the potential for human error remaining ever-present 73 
(Amalberti, 2013). To detect this evolution, the collection and analysis of near-miss data is 74 
essential (Barach & Small, 2000; Gnoni, & Lettera, 2012). This is where an error has 75 
occurred, but was detected and resolved before a loss was incurred. An error could be 76 
entering incorrect deal parameters (e.g. price, volume, maturity) into the system, a lack of 77 
communication between teams on a coordinated task (e.g. confirming and settling logistic 78 
information) or a bug in the system (e.g. sending timely breach reports).  Analysing near 79 
misses can yield at least two important types of data. First, it can indicate emerging threats to 80 
organisational safety (e.g. in terms of systems, tasks, or skills deficiencies), and this is where 81 
much of the academic literature on incident reporting has focussed (Hopkins, 2001; NASA, 82 
2001). Second, it can reveal the skills and behaviours that are important for navigating 83 
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hazards and avoiding error after an incident has occurred, and in comparison, this latter 84 
aspect is less explored within the incident reporting research literature (Van der Schaaf, 85 
Lucas, & Hale, 2013).  86 
Interestingly, this distinction reflects the debate around “safety-I” and “safety-II” approaches 87 
(Hollnagel, 2014). Safety-I refers to approaches to safety that focuses on error reduction, 88 
whereas safety-II refers to approaches that focus on the successful navigation of hazards to 89 
ensure organisational objectives are met. In industries, such as financial trading, where risk-90 
taking is integral to success, both approaches appear essential to effective risk management. 91 
Yet, in terms of utilising near miss incident monitoring to achieve this, the safety-II approach 92 
has been less utilised (Huber et al., 2009; Kleiner et al., 2015).  93 
 94 
In the current study, we examine a cohort of near miss incidents collected from a financial 95 
trading organisation. Drawing on this set of data, we address the following objectives:  96 
1. To determine whether near miss reports in financial trading contain information on 97 
the non-technical skills that enable operators to detect and prevent errors from 98 
escalating into failure, and the patterns and trends revealed by these data.  99 
2. To illustrate how the skills and systems that cause and detect/prevent error interrelate, 100 
with the purpose being to establish whether particular operator skills and systems are 101 
important for avoiding particular types of error on the trading floor  102 
 103 
This article aims to make three contributions. First, it reveals the operator non-technical skills 104 
that are important for ensuring near misses do not escalate to failure, and thus contributes to 105 
approaches for improving risk management in financial industries. Second, it systematically 106 
explores how data from incident monitoring systems can be utilised to identify operator non-107 
technical skills and behaviours important for navigating hazards and avoiding error. Third, it 108 
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considers how data from incident monitoring systems can be analysed in a fashion more 109 
consistent with a safety II approach.  110 
 111 
Financial trading environments 112 
The financial trading environment is where products (e.g. bonds, equities, commodities) are 113 
bought and sold by financial traders in order to manage investment portfolios and generate 114 
profit for investment banks, energy companies and brokers. Trading requires an ability to 115 
anticipate market trends (i.e. for buying and selling) and negotiate large wholesale trades. 116 
Due to the sums of money and time-pressure involved in trading, it is a well-paid but stressful 117 
occupation. It is also inherently risky, with reward systems incentivizing risk-taking that 118 
results in profit. Whilst this should reward analytical decision-making processes, profit can 119 
also emerge from 'noise trading' (irrational and erratic trading activities that reflect somewhat 120 
random decision-making), which in turn can negatively influence 'rational' trading (and 121 
therefore penalize logical decision-making). 122 
 123 
The trading floor itself is a large, noisy and socio-technological space wherein traders (and 124 
support teams) watch monitors and interact by phone, internal chat systems or in small 125 
groups. Each desk is grouped as a specialized desk (e.g. according to financial instruments or 126 
commodities being traded), and the successful interactions across these heterogeneous desks 127 
shapes performance (Beunza, 2004). The spatial configuration of the trading floor is 128 
standardized to provide the socio-spatial resources for promoting a situated awareness or 129 
sense making capabilities (Beunza, 2004; Hicks, 2004). Workstations are in close proximity 130 
so to allow traders to communicate with each other, and in terms of joint activity, traders 131 
typically cycle between working alone and in collaborative teams. For example, they monitor 132 
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other desks’ activity, share information, and interpret the ‘noise’ of the floor (Hicks, 2004; 133 
Willman et al., 2006).  134 
 135 
Recent work has conceptualised financial trading as a high-risk industry, where systemic 136 
failures are a product of human error, risk-taking, poor system design, and safety culture 137 
(Leaver & Reader, 2016; 2017; 2015), and have serious consequences for the organisations 138 
involved (e.g. fines, institutional collapse) and society at large (collapse in banking systems). 139 
Yet, it is a highly complex industry to study, because institutional success is simultaneously 140 
contingent on risk-taking behaviours (e.g. to make money) and error reduction (to avoid 141 
mistakes). 142 
 143 
Learning from near-misses  144 
Traditionally, financial trading is a domain in which incident data has not been collected, 145 
analysed, or learnt from. In other high-risk industries, this is central to identifying risks to 146 
organisational safety, and prioritising and designing changes for avoiding further mishaps 147 
(Phimister et al., 2003). Near misses in particular are useful for learning due to their frequent 148 
occurrence, and information on how events were/can be avoided in future (Barach & Small, 149 
2000; Reason, 2008).  150 
 151 
In order to identify the general characteristics of successful systems that collect and interpret 152 
near miss data, and to identify areas in which the field might develop, we consider a number 153 
of key research studies reporting on incident monitoring systems. Although the review is 154 
non-exhaustive, Table 1 lists six of the more commonly reported on incident-monitoring 155 
systems.  156 
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 157 
Table 1: Features of Incident Reporting Systems in High-Risk Domains 
Author Name of 
incident 
monitoring 
system 
Domain Type of data 
collected 
Positive skills  Negative skills 
Runciman, 
Webb, Lee and 
Holland, 1993. 
(AIMS) 
AIMS Aviation 2000 critical 
incident reports 
N/A System failure 
constitutes the 
bulk of the 
contributory 
factors, and 
human failure 
identified in 
approx. 80% of 
the cases 
Staender, 
Davies, 
Helmreich, 
Sexton and 
Kaufman, 1997 
(CIRS) 
CIRS Anaesthesia 60 anonymous 
critical incident 
reports via 
internet 
Concluded 
they are unable 
to assess the 
educational 
importance of 
the CI reports 
Contributory 
factor of 
communication in 
the operating 
theatre 
Beckmann, 
Baldwin, Hart 
and Runciman 
1996. AIMS-
ICU 
AIMS-ICU Intensive care 536 critical 
incident reports 
obtained from 
seven ICU’s  
N/A  Multiple 
contributory 
factors; 33% 
systems-based, 
66% human factor 
based.  
Billings, 
Lauber, 
Funkhouser, 
Lyman, Huff 
(1976) 
ASRS 
(aviation safety 
reporting 
system) 
Aviation Voluntary, non-
punitive, 
anonymous 
critical incident 
reports. 1407 
reports in the 
first quarter of 
operation.  
N/A Phases of flight 
where the incident 
occurred were 
detailed, systems 
issues, navigation, 
ground hazards 
etc. 
Davies, Wright, 
Courtney and 
Reid, 2000.  
CIRAS 
(Confidential 
Incident 
Reporting and 
Analysis 
System) 
Rail Gathers data in 
three ways; 
initial report 
form or 
telephone call, 
structured 
follow-up 
telephone 
questionnaire, 
in-depth 
interview with a 
researcher.  
N/A Fatigue, lapses of 
attention, breaches 
of procedure, 
problems with 
equipment 
CHIRP 
Charitable 
CHIRP 
(Confidential 
Human factors 
Aviation Confidential 
reports from 
pilots, flight 
N/A Does not formally 
request 
information on the 
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Trust, 1999 Incident 
Reporting 
Programme) 
deck personnel, 
licensed 
engineers, 
maintenance 
workers in the 
airline industry.  
contributing / 
mitigating factors, 
how the incident 
was discovered, or 
suggested 
corrective actions 
 158 
As table 1 indicates, there is no established standard for the design and implementation of 159 
incident monitoring systems yet there are a number of common features (Gnoni et al., 2013; 160 
Goldenhar, Williams, & Swanson, 2003; Wu et al., 2010).  161 
 162 
Most systems confidentially and anonymously collect data on consequential incidents and 163 
near misses. Analyses often focus on the causes of incidents (e.g. fatigue, communication), 164 
and these data are used to specify improvements in systems and skills (e.g. teamwork) for 165 
avoiding future recurrences (Barach & Small, 2000; Reason, 2008). Near misses (where due 166 
to luck or intervention, harm did not occur) are seen as particularly important to analyse due 167 
to them indicating the potentiality for consequential events (e.g. accidents). They can both 168 
indicate the causes of an incident, and also the processes and behaviours that prevent 169 
incidents becoming harmful (e.g. indicating the robustness of systems). For example, in 170 
reporting on the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System, Sarter and Alexander (2000) have 171 
described how errors in aviation are often detected and ameliorated through routine checks 172 
(Sarter & Alexander, 2000). Data on error detection and recovery has been gleaned from near 173 
miss data in various domains (Abeysekera et al., 2005; Baysari et al., 2009; Lewis et al., 174 
2009; Wu, Pronovost, & Morlock, 2002), with researchers examining the processes, 175 
countermeasures, and cues for detecting error and responding to error (Kessels-Habraken et 176 
al., 2010; Patel et al., 2011).  177 
 178 
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Nonetheless, and overall, the incident reporting literature has tended to focus on the causes of 179 
incidents, and the systems and skills required to minimise these (e.g. within the systems 180 
reported in table 1). Less work (and none in financial trading) has systematically examined 181 
the operator skills required for detecting and recovering from human error (i.e. near misses). 182 
For example, non-technical skills theory has been applied to systematically categorise and 183 
interpret the staff behaviours and activities leading to near misses (Reader et al., 2006), and 184 
to use these insights to suggest behaviours optimal for maintain safety. However, to our 185 
knowledge, this approach has not been taken to systematically analysing near misses.  Yet, 186 
this might be useful in order to identify and train the key skills and behaviours that are found 187 
to underlie the detection and recovery of different errors and problem types. This is a 188 
somewhat positivistic perspective on incident reporting, and is consistent with Amalberti’s 189 
(2013) description of ‘ultra-resilient’ organisations and Hollnagel’s (2014) conceptualisation 190 
of “Safety-II” (Amalberti, 2013; Hollnagel, 2014).  191 
 192 
Ultra-resilient organisations relate to the observation that in many dynamic and fast-moving 193 
industries that manage risk, it is not possible - or in some cases desirable - to entirely 194 
engineer risk out of the system. For example, this phenomena is observed in healthcare where 195 
procedures that create alternative risks for patients are necessary to the delivery of treatments 196 
(Reader, Reddy, & Brett, 2017), deep-sea fishing where workers operate in dangerous 197 
weather conditions (Amalberti, 2013), or financial trading where some risk-taking is 198 
necessary to achieve competitive advantage (Leaver & Reader, 2017). In these cases, risk is 199 
managed through improving employee skills and system design, and ensuring that where 200 
risk-taking is not successful, loss is avoided. Reflecting this, the “safety-II” approach argues 201 
that safety management involves a mixture of both error reduction (“safety-I”) and also the 202 
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identification of the skills and behaviours that enable things to go well (and in particular to 203 
navigate hazards). We explore this in the domain of financial trading.  204 
  205 
CURRENT STUDY 206 
In the current study, and using a previously established incident analysis tool, we examine 207 
whether near-miss reports in financial trading yield data that is useful and can be reliably 208 
coded in terms of the operator skills (and systems that support them) that prevent incidents 209 
from being realised (i.e. causing losses). For the first time, we place this phenomenon within 210 
a non-technical skills framework, and do so in order to augment previous research outlining 211 
the operator skills and behaviours that underlie effective risk management in financial 212 
trading.  213 
 214 
Research Questions 215 
Our research addresses the following two questions.  216 
 217 
First, we determine the extent to which the near miss data collected on the trading floor 218 
contain reliably analysable information on human factors skills that contribute to, and 219 
prevent, errors. Through analysing these data, we identify the frequency and nature of 220 
operator skills and systems that ameliorate near misses. For example, how teamwork skills 221 
such as coordination (e.g. cross checking of information on shared tasks) and situation 222 
awareness skills such as attention (e.g. during routine task work) are key to capturing error on 223 
the trading floor. In terms of financial trading, relatively little is known about how error is 224 
averted on the trading floor. To explore this, we use a human factors framework designed 225 
specifically for providing insight into the skills used to detect and ameliorate error on the 226 
trading floor (the Financial Incident Analysis System: Leaver & Reader, 2016).  227 
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 228 
Second, we establish whether particular operator skills and systems are important for 229 
avoiding particular types of error on the trading floor (i.e. combinations). This will reveal 230 
whether there are specific skills required for managing particular errors, and yield 231 
implications for training and error management strategies in financial trading.  232 
 233 
METHOD 234 
 235 
FINANS 236 
This study utilises data collected using the Financial Incident Analysis System (FINANS). 237 
FINANS is a confidential, voluntary incident reporting system designed with input from 238 
other incident reporting systems in similarly high-risk domains such as the Aviation Safety 239 
Reporting System (ASRS) in aviation. FINANS provides a standardised method for 240 
collecting data on operational incidents that occur on the trading floor, a reliable method for 241 
analysing and extracting human factors related contributors to operational incidents, and 242 
practical insight into how these contributors might be ameliorated. A fuller explanation of the 243 
merits, reliability and theoretical foundations of the FINANS tool can be found in Leaver and 244 
Reader (2016).  245 
 246 
Fundamentally, the system comprises two parts. The first part is the ‘incident log’. To recap, 247 
an incident in this context is an event that did lead to (e.g. failure) or could have led to (e.g. 248 
near miss) losses or unwanted market or credit risk exposure. Incidents can be wide-ranging, 249 
and include technical systems error (e.g. pricing tool failures), erroneous human input errors, 250 
misunderstandings of instructions or procedures between departments (e.g. between a trader 251 
and their risk department), and rule violations (e.g. late trade entry). This first part of the 252 
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system has several functional components that must be filled in by the reporter: identification 253 
of the team who detects the events, identification of the origin of the error (by team), date of 254 
event occurrence and detection and a free form verbal description of the event. Once the 255 
event is entered into the log, the incident is coded by the analyst (lead author). Data is 256 
aggregated and analysed in terms of descriptors for each incident (e.g. consequences, where 257 
and when incidents occurred). The log is accessible to all trading department staff on their 258 
local workstations and reports are regularly submitted by traders, risk control analysts (e.g. 259 
middle office and back office) as well as operators.  260 
   261 
The second part of FINANS is a taxonomical system for interpreting incidents and near 262 
misses in terms of contributory factors. The taxonomy consists of a ‘category’ and ‘element’ 263 
(sub-category) levels. Categories function at a relatively generic level (e.g. situation 264 
awareness), and elements reflect aspects of activity specific to the trading floor environment 265 
that illustrate the categories (Flin & Patey, 2011). Moreover, each incident can potentially be 266 
coded within FINANS as single or multiple category and subcategory levels. For example, an 267 
incident may be identified as caused by teamwork (subcategory coordination) or teamwork 268 
(subcategory coordination) as well as situation awareness (sub categories attention and 269 
gathering of information). The full taxonomy used to codify the incidents is provided in 270 
Table 2 below.  271 
 272 
Table 2. FINANS Human Factors Taxonomy 
Category Associated Elements 
Situation Awareness  Attention (distraction, lack of concentration, divided or overly focused 
attention) 
 Gathering information (poorly organised information, not enough gathering of 
information) 
 Interpretation of information (miscomprehension, assumptions based on 
previous experience) 
 Anticipation (i.e. thinking ahead, judging how a situation will develop) 
 Other 
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Teamwork  Role and Responsibilities (e.g. unclear segregation of roles) 
 Communication and exchanging of information between team members 
 Shared understanding for goals and tasks 
 Coordination of shared activities 
 Solving conflicts (e.g. between team members and teams) 
 Knowledge sharing between teams 
 Other 
Decision Making  Defining the problem 
 Cue recognition (e.g. finding and recognising the cues to the decision) 
 Seeking advice on a decision 
 Noise and distraction (e.g. that reduce capacity to take a decision) 
 Bias and heuristics (e.g. over optimism, over confidence) 
 Other 
Leadership 
 
 
 
 
 
 Authority and assertiveness (e.g. taking command of a situation) 
 Listening 
 Prioritisation of goals (e.g. team / organisational) 
 Managing workloads and resources 
 Monitoring activity and performance of team members 
 Maintain standards and ensuring procedures are followed 
 Other 
Slip/Lapse  Fat Fingers 
 Procedural (not following a protocol, or following a protocol incorrectly) 
 Routinized task (e.g. a loss of concentration) 
 Forgetfulness (forgetting information, or how to perform an activity) 
 Memory 
 Distraction 
 Other 
Human Computer 
Interface 
 Use of the Tools (e.g. spread sheets) 
 Training on the tool 
 System did not detect the error 
 Design of the software and application 
 Maintenance and testing of the tool 
 Other 
  
 273 
The second part of FINANS importantly allows us collect human factors data through the 274 
coding framework in order to extract information on the human factors skills that influence 275 
error on the trading floor and provides more fine grained insight into the skills (e.g. team 276 
communication and coordination) and behaviours (e.g. cross checking with team members) 277 
that are important for averting error.  278 
 279 
Procedure 280 
FINANS was used to collect incident reports in the participating organization from January 281 
2014 until January 2016. With the support of the organisation, traders and trading support 282 
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staff were briefed on human factors, non-technical skills and data entry in the system in 283 
advance of the deployment of the incident log and then asked to report the incidents in the 284 
log.  285 
 286 
Following each reporting month, a trained human factors expert provides feedback reports 287 
(e.g. historical trends, evolving patterns of risk types) to the participating staff and 288 
management. Over this period, 1,042 unique incident reports (i.e. each incident reporting on a 289 
problematic trade was different) detailing an operational incident were collected and deemed 290 
suitable for analysis (e.g. clear text and a near miss event).  291 
 292 
Near miss occurred in 96% of the selected errors (e.g. 1,000 cases of near miss, 42 cases of 293 
failure). Of the 1,000 near miss incidents, the lead author coded all the cases; 250 (25%) were 294 
coded by a human factors expert in order to provide a reliability assessment for coding.  295 
For the purpose of this study, the author only considered near miss incidents that were 296 
reported as the aim of the analysis is to uncover how the incidents are caught or detected 297 
within the organisation.  298 
 299 
The coding process was made up of five steps; (1) selection of the relevant human factors 300 
skills category (e.g. situation awareness, decision making, teamwork, leadership, human 301 
computer interface, or slip/lapse), (2) the selection of the relevant subcategory (i.e. element) 302 
of non-technical skills (e.g. if situation awareness is chosen as a main category, the 303 
element(s) can be selected from; distraction, gathering information, interpreting information, 304 
anticipation of future states), (3) identification of single team or multiple teams, (4) 305 
identification of an on-going state or isolated nature of the incident, (5) indication of whether 306 
the error is near miss or a failure. Each of the 1,000 incidents were coded in these five steps 307 
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twice: once to identify the set of codes dedicated to the causes of error (e.g. identifying what 308 
went wrong) and a second time to identify the set of codes dedicated to the skills and systems 309 
that led to the detection and prevention of error (e.g. identifying what went right). The human 310 
factors codes used in FINANS have been reliably used to extract the skills that underpin error 311 
in previous studies across a range of incidents (near miss and failure) (Leaver & Reader, 312 
2016). The concepts that underpin the coding framework were identified through a literature 313 
review of relevant concepts in the financial trading domain, a review of existing systems 314 
successful in place in other high-risk domains and feedback from subject matter experts 315 
(Leaver & Reader, 2016). In this analysis, we follow the assumption that the skills that 316 
underpin error are similar to the set of skills used to ameliorate error (Flin, O’Connor, & 317 
Crichton, 2008). 318 
 319 
ANALYSIS 320 
The results section reports on the following three analyses.  321 
 322 
First we assess the reliability of coding for determining the causes of near misses, and the 323 
identification of factors that led to their detection and prevention. To do this, we present the 324 
reliability between the two expert coders using Cohen’s kappa statistic in order to assure the 325 
coding outcomes are consistent and robust (Fleiss, Cohen, & Everitt, 1969; LeBreton & 326 
Senter, 2007).  327 
 328 
Second, to identify the frequency with which various human factors skills cause and - for the 329 
first time in human factors literature - ameliorate near misses we undertake a frequency 330 
analysis of the coded incidents. This involved analysing the coded dataset to ascertain how 331 
often each code or group of codes occurs across the whole dataset in order to infer the most 332 
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influential (e.g. highest occurrence) and least influential (e.g. lowest occurrence) skill 333 
categories. For example, this analysis reveals which skill problems are most likely to generate 334 
error (e.g. ‘fat fingers’) and which skills are most commonly drawn upon to capture error 335 
(e.g. attention).  336 
 337 
Third we undertook an analysis of the skills and systems used to detect and prevent error and 338 
the causes of error together, the purpose of which is to illustrate how the skills that cause 339 
error and the skills that ameliorate error may interrelate. Specifically, by examining the 340 
frequency of occurrence (or otherwise) of every binary combination of skills we assess the 341 
relationships within the human factors codes separately for the causes of error and skills and 342 
systems that led to the detection and prevention error. For example, we explore whether, 343 
when near misses are remediated by teamwork skills, do situation awareness skills also tend 344 
to play a role in the remediation too, or do the two factors not occur together? This analysis 345 
helpfully contextualises the human factors findings and promotes a deeper understanding of 346 
how error is captured on the floor.  347 
 348 
RESULTS 349 
Financial trading staff reported 1,000 near miss incident reports through FINANS from 350 
January 2014 to January 2016. Near miss events accounted for 96% of reported errors within 351 
this time period (where 4% were classified as failures). This equates to less than 1% of trades 352 
within the company, and due to the data being generated through staff self-reporting, is likely 353 
to be an underestimation.  354 
  355 
Reliability Analysis 356 
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We examined the reliability of coding between the author and a human factors expert. Of the 357 
1,000 incidents, the lead author coded all the cases; 250 (25%) of the cases are coded by the 358 
third author to provide reliability assessment. Those cases were randomly selected from the 359 
batch. All incidents had at least one code from the FINANS taxonomy applied to explain the 360 
incident (e.g. incidents can be coded as multiple categories and elements). At the category 361 
level, the reliability was generally good or substantial1 across both positive and negative 362 
categories.  363 
 364 
For the causes of error at the category level, the reliability was good for situation awareness 365 
(k=0.499 and teamwork (k=0.567) and substantial for leadership (k=0.647), slip/lapse 366 
(k=0.65) and human-computer interaction (k=0.748).  367 
 368 
  Cause of Error   Prevention of Error 
 
Cohen's κ 
 
p-value 
 
Cohen's κ 
 
p-value 
SA 0.499 
 
<0.001 
 
0.549 
 
0 
TMWK 0.567 
 
<0.001 
 
0.503 
 
<0.001 
DM - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
LD 0.647 
 
<0.001 
 
0.453 
 
<0.001 
SL 0.65 
 
<0.001 
 
- 
 
- 
HCI 0.748   <0.001   0.655   0 
 369 
  Cause of Error   Prevention of Error 
 
Cohen's κ 
 
Agreement 
 
p-value 
 
Cohen's κ 
 
Agreement 
 
p-value 
SA 0.499 
 
Good 
 
<0.001 
 
0.549 
 
Good 
 
0 
TMWK 0.567 
 
Good 
 
<0.001 
 
0.503 
 
Good 
 
<0.001 
DM - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
LD 0.647 
 
Substantial 
 
<0.001 
 
0.453 
 
Good 
 
<0.001 
SL 0.65 
 
Substantial 
 
<0.001 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
HCI 0.748   Substantial   <0.001   0.655   Substantial   0 
Figure 1: Kappa and p values for factors causing or ameliorating error 370 
                                                          
1 Good reliability: 0.41 = k = 0.60 and substantial reliability 0.61 = k = 0.80 (McHugh, 2012) 
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Cohen's κ and p-values were not calculated where there were fewer than five instances of the 371 
factor causing or ameliorating error as these statistics would not be robust. 372 
For the skills and system that led to the detection and prevention of error reliability was good 373 
for situation awareness (k=0.549), teamwork (k=0.503), leadership (k=0.453) and substantial 374 
for human-computer interface (k=0.655). For the detection of error coded in this study, 375 
slip/lapse was never chosen. This result is expected due to the nature of the slip/lapse 376 
categories (e.g. fat fingers, forgetfulness) that would not detect error, but primarily be the 377 
cause. Furthermore, as decision-making was never chosen in the coding, there are no 378 
reliability statistics for this category. This result is similar to previous studies where decision-379 
making was rarely chosen when coding incidents (Leaver & Reader, 2016).  380 
 381 
This shows that near miss incidents collected in the financial trading domain can be reliably 382 
coded for human factors and contain relevant information of the skills that cause error and for 383 
the first time, indicate that the critical incidents contain information of the skills / behaviours 384 
that are used to capture error on the trading floor.  385 
 386 
Skills and systems for detecting error  387 
Our first analysis establishes the extent to which near-miss data contains information on the 388 
skills and systems for detecting and preventing error. To provide an overview of the data, 389 
Table 3 details the occurrences of each human factor category and element used in FINANS 390 
to classify the causes of error and the skills that led to the detection of error.  391 
 392 
Table 3: Frequency of human factors categories and elements found in the cases (n=1,000) 393 
  
Causes of error 
Skills and systems that led to the detection and 
prevention of error 
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Category 
Category 
Count (% 
overall) 
Subcategory 
Subcategory 
Count (% 
within 
category) 
Category 
Count 
(% 
overall) 
Subcategory 
Subcategory 
Count (% 
within 
category) 
Situational 
Awareness 
130 
(13%) 
Anticipation 12 (9%) 460 
(46%) 
Anticipation 102 (22%) 
Attention 78 (60%) Attention 123 (27%) 
Gathering Information 40 (30%) Gathering Information 161 (35%) 
Interpreting Information 7 (5%) 
Interpreting 
Information 
48 (10%) 
Teamwork 205 
(21%) 
Communication 53 (26%) 646 
(65%) 
Communication 96 (15%) 
Coordination 70 (34%) Coordination 112 (17%) 
Roles and 
Responsibilities 
79 (39%) 
Roles and 
Responsibilities 
340 (53%) 
Shared Understanding 39 (19%) Shared Understanding 79 (12%) 
Decision 
Making 
11 (1%) Bias and Heuristics 9 (82%) 14 (1%) Bias and Heuristics 0 (0%) 
Cue Recognition 3 (27%) Cue Recognition 14 (100%) 
Leadership 113 
(11%) 
Maintaining Standards 27 (24%) 21 (2%) Maintaining Standards 3 (14%) 
Monitoring Activity 87 (77%) Monitoring Activity 17 (81%) 
Slip/Lapse 523 
(52%) 
Fat Fingers 343 (66%) 2 (0.2%) Fat Fingers 1 (50%) 
Memory 56 (11%) Memory 0 (0.0%) 
Procedural 126 (24%) Procedural 0 (0.0%) 
Human-
Computer 
Interaction 
211 
(21%) 
Maintenance and 
Testing 
123 (58%) 
154 
(15%) 
Maintenance and 
Testing 
1 (0.6%) 
System Detection 29 (14%) System Detection 84 (55%) 
Use Of Tools 63 (30%) Use Of Tools 50 (33%) 
 394 
In terms of using FINANS to better understand the human factors that support the detection 395 
of error in the trading domain, Table 3 shows that all near miss were coded with a human 396 
factors category, with over half the near miss being caused by slip/lapse (52%) and 397 
ameliorated by teamwork (65%).  The sections below provide a granular description of the 398 
skills that cause error and the skills that help trading staff capture error (e.g. near miss 399 
incident).  400 
 401 
Causes of error. Table 3 confirms the findings of previous studies of causes of error using 402 
FINANS (Leaver & Reader, 2016). The majority of the errors are a product of slip/lapse 403 
(52%) problems and issues in human computer interaction (21%). The least coded category 404 
was decision making (1%).  405 
 406 
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In absolute terms, the most commonly coded element was fat fingers (343), followed by 407 
procedural (126) and maintenance and testing of systems (123). As seen in previous studies 408 
using FINANS, some elements were rarely coded; interpreting information (7), cue 409 
recognition (3), and bias and heuristics (9); however, unlike previous studies, each element 410 
was coded at least once in the data coding process.  411 
 412 
Skills and systems that led to the detection and prevention of error. Table 3 indicates that 413 
overwhelmingly the error is detected and prevented by teamwork skills (65%) followed 414 
closely by situation awareness (46%). Human computer interface skills were identified in 415 
15% of the near miss. The least coded category was slip/lapse (0.2%), followed by decision-416 
making (1.4%) and leadership (2%).  417 
In terms of elements, the most commonly coded was role and responsibilities (340), gathering 418 
information (161) and attention (123). Some elements were rarely coded for such as bias & 419 
heuristics (0), fat fingers (1), procedural (1), memory (0) and maintenance and testing (1).  420 
 421 
Our analysis of the frequency of human factors in the set of collected near miss incidents 422 
shows that slip/lapse and human computer interface are the leading cause of error in the 423 
financial trading domain, and for the first time in human factors literature, identifies that 424 
teamwork and situation awareness skills are essential to capturing and preventing error.   425 
 426 
To illustrate the context of the data collection (and the potential for intervention), and the 427 
types of problems and skills being identified using FINANS, Table 4 provides a sample of 428 
characteristic codified examples.  429 
 430 
Table 4: Example data that could be reported and codified through FINANS  
 21 
Incident Description Human Factors problems 
identified in the cases  
Specific behaviours that helped 
to ameliorate the error  
Deals were downloaded with 
incorrect prices, and the wrong 
market parameters were sent 
into pre-publication. The error 
was picked up when a second 
team member noticed a 
discrepancy 
Situation awareness (attention) 
Human computer interface (use 
of tools) 
Teamwork (roles and 
responsibilities) 
Situation awareness (attention, 
gathering information) 
A change in a contractual item 
not communicated between the 
relevant teams and noticed 
during a transaction booking 
Teamwork (communication) Situation awareness (gathering 
information, interpreting 
information) 
Teamwork (seeking out 
information through informal 
communication) 
Entering an extra digit on the 
price (e.g. 0.01 versus 0.1) 
Slip/lapse (fat fingers) Teamwork (roles and 
responsibilities) 
Situation Awareness (attention) 
Out-dated procedures not 
updated in the shared 
communication platform can 
lead to problems in task 
handover  
Slip/lapse (procedures), 
situation awareness 
(anticipation) 
Leadership (maintaining 
standards), teamwork (roles and 
responsibilities, coordination) 
Situation awareness 
(anticipation) 
A hedge transacted by one team 
member for the group exposure 
with delayed communication 
about the details, meaning that 
hours are lost determining an 
alternate hedging scenario  
Teamwork (coordination & 
communication) 
Slip/lapse (procedural) 
Situation awareness (gathering 
of information) 
Teamwork (roles and 
responsibilities) 
The price and volume of the 
deal were inverted 
Slip/lapse (fat fingers, 
distraction) 
Teamwork (roles and 
responsibilities)  
Situation awareness (attention) 
 431 
Table 4 reveals some key features of the reported data: it typically generates from a principal 432 
cause and then travels through various social (e.g. teamwork) and/or cognitive (e.g. situation 433 
awareness) layers of defence. For example, error on the trading floor is characteristically 434 
caused by slip/lapse error (e.g. ‘fat fingers’), this might then be compounded by a missed 435 
check at the risk control stage (e.g. missing a step in the role’s stated goals and procedure) 436 
and subsequently detected through a secondary cross-check by another alert team member or 437 
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the back office team before processing the trade (e.g. cross checking information of another 438 
team member) 439 
 440 
To expand on the observation that error may be captured due to the interaction of multiple 441 
skill competencies, we undertook an analysis of the skills and systems used to detect and 442 
prevent error and the causes of error together, the purpose of which is to illustrate how the 443 
skills that cause error and the skills that ameliorate error may interrelate. 444 
 445 
Associations between the causes of error and the skills and systems that detect error 446 
In this analysis we assess whether there are particular relationships within the human factors 447 
codes for the causes of error and the skills that led to the detection of error. For example, the 448 
data collected through FINANS indicate that near misses are most often remediated by 449 
teamwork skills and situation awareness skills, but how often do these categories occur 450 
together or in isolation? Are these skills remediating a typical set of causes? This analysis is 451 
exploratory in design and aims to examine whether patterns emerge from the coding that 452 
shows how error emerges, migrates and is captured on the trading floor.  453 
 454 
Associations between the causes of error. Of the 1,000 near miss incidents, 195 had more 455 
than one cause of error. Slip/lapse, the most common cause of error, nearly always occurred 456 
in isolation. This means that the causes of error are principally one skill or another (e.g. 457 
slip/lapse or human computer interface) and less often the result of multiple skill problems.   458 
 459 
Associations amongst the skills and systems used to detect and prevent error. Multiple factors 460 
were more common for the skills and systems that detect and prevent error than the causes of 461 
error. Of the 1,000 near miss incidents, 295 had more than one skill or system that detected 462 
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and prevented error. In over one third of cases where decision-making, slip/lapse, teamwork, 463 
or leadership were identified as factors, situational awareness was also identified as a 464 
preventative factor. Due to the low number of incidents were decision-making, slip/lapse, and 465 
leadership were identified as preventative factors, the relationship with situational awareness 466 
was only statistically significant for teamwork (𝜒1
2 = 138.38, p<0.001). Nearly one-third of 467 
the 646 near miss cases where teamwork was a factor, situation awareness was also identified 468 
as a factor (208).  469 
 470 
This means that the human factors responsible for causing (81%) and ameliorating (71%) 471 
near miss incidents therefore predominantly occurred in isolation. Exceptionally, teamwork 472 
and situation awareness, the two most frequent human factors responsible for ameliorating 473 
near misses, were the most likely to occur together doing so in just under half (45%) of all 474 
near miss where situation awareness prevented a near-miss. This analysis reveals that 475 
regardless of the cause of the error, situation awareness and teamwork are the leading skills 476 
used to capture and prevent error.  477 
 478 
The association analysis preformed in this study shows that slip/lapse and human computer 479 
interface often occur alone (𝜒1
2 = 249.79, p<0.001) and are the main contributors to error 480 
causation, whereas the prevention of error is largely a result of teamwork and situation 481 
awareness skills. Moreover, regardless of what causes the error, teamwork and situation 482 
awareness are the preventative skills that protect the organisation from error.  483 
 484 
Situation awareness and teamwork skills appear universally important as a ‘last-line’ of 485 
defence for preventing trading mishaps, no matter the cause. The specific skills that are 486 
important to capturing error (e.g. gathering of information, attention) are supported through 487 
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processes such as the ability to ask questions, alertness, participatory engagement and 488 
collaborative working groups. Teamwork skills such as roles and responsibilities, 489 
coordination and communication are also critical. These skills are supported by a strong 490 
perception of shared responsibility over team tasks and goals, cross-departmental team 491 
working sessions and communication aids such as internal messaging services, break out 492 
spaces and global virtual chat rooms.  493 
  494 
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DISCUSSION 495 
This study identified the role of operator skills and systems for causing and preventing error 496 
in the domain of financial trading. It revealed the following.  497 
 498 
First, similar to past studies (Leaver & Reader, 2016), slip/lapse related errors (e.g. fat 499 
fingers) are the most frequently coded skill category (52%). These most often occurred in 500 
isolation from other human factors problems. Issues around human computer interaction are 501 
the second most commonly coded human factors issue (21%), with human computer 502 
interfaces compromising the effective gathering and interpretation of information by users.  503 
 504 
Secondly, and less examined within the literature, near-miss reports contain useful 505 
information about the operator non-technical skills that detect and prevent error. They report 506 
the attributes and behaviours that prevent errors from becoming realised losses. Whereas 507 
errors in financial trading are predominantly caused by slip/lapse and human-computer 508 
interface problems, most near miss are averted by good situation awareness (46%) and 509 
teamwork (65%) skills. The skills occurred in concert, with trading staff vigilance for arising 510 
issues (and understanding what they look like, and when they occur) and abilities to work 511 
with others to resolve them (e.g. sharing calculations and task critical information) being 512 
essential.  513 
 514 
Third, and building on the previous point, no matter the causes of near misses, situation 515 
awareness and teamwork were the key skills for detecting and preventing them. This is to 516 
say, situation awareness and teamwork skills appear universally important as a ‘last-line’ of 517 
defence for preventing trading mishaps, no matter the cause. The specific skills that are 518 
important to capturing error (e.g. gathering of information, attention, roles & responsibilities) 519 
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are supported through processes such as the ability to ask questions, alertness, participatory 520 
engagement and collaborative working groups. Teamwork skills such as communication 521 
between team members (e.g. following complex handover of tasks) and clear team roles and 522 
responsibilities (e.g. vigilance in verifying the data and conclusions published within the 523 
team’s daily reports) are also critical. 524 
 525 
Theoretical implications 526 
The research findings demonstrate the value of analysing near misses in terms of the operator 527 
skills and systems that prevent the realisation of loss. Through FINANS, a non-technical 528 
skills perspective was adopted to interpret the ‘safety nets’ that prevent everyday errors and 529 
problems from resulting in error. This found the vigilance and cooperative behaviours of 530 
financial trading staff to be critical in identifying errors and problems that were produced by 531 
system-related issues (e.g. human computer interfaces) and slip/lapses. This supports 532 
previous observations within the incident reporting literature. For example, in terms of 533 
incident reporting data revealing the checks, routines, processes, and cues used by operators 534 
to identify and ameliorate error, meaning they become ‘near misses’ rather than 535 
consequential events (Abeysekera et al., 2005; Baysari et al., 2009; Patel et al., 2011; Sarter 536 
& Alexander, 2000). Associating error types and the skills that are used to detect them is 537 
novel and this information can be used to improve risk management in this domain. 538 
 539 
The finding that error detection privileges the team working together resonates with the 540 
broader literature on non-technical skills and error detection and recovery. For example, in 541 
terms of recognising and recovering from error (Nikolic & Sarter, 2007) the social 542 
behaviours (e.g. communication) used to recover errors (de Leval et al., 2000), the 543 
importance of cross-checking behaviours (Kontogiannis & Malakis, 2009), and the 544 
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consequences of operators not identifying errors (Kessels-Habraken et al., 2010). For 545 
situation awareness, the literature has previously shown attentional problems to underlie error 546 
and incidents, and to a lesser extent (and not in terms of incident reporting) the role of 547 
situation awareness in hazard detection (Underwood, Ngai, & Underwood, 2013). In terms of 548 
teamwork, our findings corresponds with research on the importance of cross-checking 549 
behaviours for avoiding error (Patterson et al., 2007), and communication and cooperative 550 
activities to avoid the escalation of errors into harm (Manser, 2009). The data collected in the 551 
current study points to the importance of team situation awareness processes in error 552 
detection and recovery (Endsley, 1995): for example in sharing and confirming 553 
understandings of the trading environment. This is relatively unexplored area within the 554 
situation awareness literature, and incident reporting more generally.  555 
 556 
Thus, within domains such as financial trading, the insights that can be derived from near 557 
miss-data collected through incident reporting systems are both important for identifying the 558 
non-technical skill deficiencies that underlie error, and also the skills that support error 559 
detection and recovery (with teamwork and situation awareness being key). This is similar to 560 
other domains, and is especially important for financial trading, as the skills that are found to 561 
cause errors are difficult to eradicate and have limited margin for safety improvement (e.g. it 562 
is unrealistic to re-configure the system interface to perfection or eliminate all ‘fat fingers’ 563 
errors).  564 
 565 
Synthesizing the skills that help capture error on the floor helps to build a more 566 
comprehensive understanding of the migration of error on the floor, leading to better-567 
informed and wider reaching safety interventions. It accepts that risk is ever-present within 568 
the system, with human operators providing the last-line of defence. Incident reports have 569 
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value in revealing what ‘goes well’ alongside ‘what goes wrong’ (Dekker, 2014). This links 570 
into “safety-II” approaches to human factors (Hollnagel, 2014), with near miss data collected 571 
through incident reporting systems representing a resource for identifying and recognising the 572 
value of everyday behaviours that support performance and the navigation of hazards. This is 573 
important in domains such as financial trading, where human factors approaches to managing 574 
risk require a delicate balance in terms of prescribing the conditions and systems requisite for 575 
ensuring a level of risk control, and also recognising the flexibility and skills of operators 576 
required for ensuring competitive advantage and the avoidance of losses.  577 
 578 
Practical implications 579 
In terms of organisational learning and risk management within financial trading, near misses 580 
provide useful insight.   581 
 582 
First, the data indicates the importance of situation awareness and teamwork for capturing 583 
and resolving error. This has important implications for identifying the types of skills and 584 
behaviours that are valued by trading organisations, and might be shared and trained. Where 585 
incidents in financial trading do lead to losses, these can be significant. Well-trained (e.g. in 586 
terms of vigilance for types of problems, cooperative activities) operators may be able to 587 
reduce the conversion of near misses to ‘hits’. Although this is not a novel insight, for an 588 
industry such as financial trading, it is somewhat contrary to the socio-technological 589 
environment. In financial trading, performance is generally considered to be highly 590 
individualised (e.g. bonus allocation schemes rewarding top performers), with market 591 
knowledge and analytical skills being especially prized (Willman et al., 2002). Yet, our 592 
findings shed light on how the collective system acts as a protective layer for the 593 
organisation, with teamwork (e.g. roles & responsibilities) and situation awareness (e.g. 594 
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gathering of information and attention) skills being essential yet not currently recognised, 595 
recruited for, or trained. This perhaps also speakers to the role of organisational culture, and 596 
the importance of collaborative acts, responsibilities for risk management, and perceptions of 597 
management commitment to safety (Leaver & Reader, 2017).  598 
 599 
Second, the data gives insight on organisational changes that might be deleterious for risk 600 
management. For example, the change or automation of technical systems that is important 601 
for operators to identify and spot errors (e.g. the automation of daily profit and loss 602 
calculations). Often in the trading domain, systems and interfaces are changed for business 603 
development needs, with insights from users and risk managers not being sought. 604 
Furthermore, trading is a highly globalised industry, with risk control functions increasingly 605 
being centralised to one geographical location (rather than being co-located with traders). The 606 
near-miss data revealed that cooperation between risk control teams and traders are often 607 
important for identifying and managing incidents, and changes to working structures may 608 
disrupt this. At the minimum, ensuring communication between these professional groups 609 
(e.g. using live running web cams or global chat rooms filtered by activity) would appear 610 
essential.    611 
 612 
Importantly, the skills that have been identified as essential to capturing error (e.g. gathering 613 
of information, attention, roles & responsibilities) are supported through processes such as 614 
the ability to ask questions, alertness, participatory engagement and collaborative working 615 
groups and these are all behaviours that are promoted in a positive organisational (safety) 616 
culture. Although the error analysis undertaken in this study usefully guides us with granular 617 
insights into the behaviours that generate error and the skills that are used to capture error, 618 
these behaviours are positioned within a much larger cultural frame of the organisation. For 619 
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example, the behaviours that drive the capture of error (e.g. taking the initiative to cross 620 
check team members work) are a product of the practises and norms that are encouraged and 621 
rewarded within the organisation. Understanding the culture is therefore important for 622 
explaining and changing negative and positive behaviours related to risk-management in 623 
financial trading.  624 
 625 
 626 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 627 
The results are constrained by the nature of incident reporting generally, which is vulnerable 628 
to underreporting and incomplete information about incidents (O’Connor, O’Dea, & Melton, 629 
2007). In the trading domain, the need for an individual to be aware that the event has 630 
occurred, their limited perspective on the incident, and their motivation to report constrain 631 
incident reporting. Furthermore, only one coder analysed all the near miss incidents (with a 632 
second coder analysing 25% of the near miss incidents to assess inter-rater reliability) and the 633 
data analysis was constrained by the clarity of the text and the potential biases of trading staff 634 
in recalling the incident. Moreover, the reliability analysis revealed scope for improving the 635 
FINANS taxonomy, and it may require further development to tailor it to near miss data. 636 
Issues such as stress, fatigue, and environmental factors (e.g. culture) were not examined and 637 
this could be the focus of future work. Moreover, the human factors research within this 638 
study refers to non-technical skills as ‘skills’ and in order to keep consistency refers to the 639 
additional set of human factors codes (e.g. slip/lapse, human computer interface) as ‘skills’ as 640 
well. Therefore the terminology around this may be somewhat confused (error within the 641 
non-technical skills literature is often observed as a problem in skill application).  642 
 643 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 644 
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In the current study, we examined a cohort of near miss incidents collected from a financial 645 
trading organisation to identify the frequency and nature of operator skills and systems that 646 
ameliorate near misses and to establish whether particular operator skills and systems are 647 
important for avoiding particular types of error on the trading floor.  648 
 649 
Our analysis reveals that the majority of the errors are a product of slip/lapse (52%) problems 650 
and issues in human computer interaction (21%). Our analysis of the reported near miss 651 
incidents show that overwhelmingly error is detected and prevented by teamwork skills 652 
(65%) followed closely by situation awareness (46%). Going further, our research reveals 653 
that slip/lapse, the most common cause of error, nearly always occurred in isolation. This 654 
means that the causes of error are principally one skill or another (e.g. skip/lapse or human 655 
computer interface) and less often the result of multiple skill problems. Exceptionally, 656 
teamwork and situation awareness, the two most frequent human factors responsible for 657 
ameliorating near misses, were the most likely to occur together doing so in just under half 658 
(45%) of all near miss where situation awareness prevented a near-miss. This analysis reveals 659 
that regardless of the cause of the error, situation awareness and teamwork are the leading 660 
skills used to capture and prevent error.  661 
 662 
The outcomes of this research contribute to approaches for improving risk management in 663 
financial industries, and further exploring how near-miss data collected through incident 664 
monitoring systems can be analysed to determine the operator non-technical skills that 665 
underpin system safety.   666 
 667 
 668 
 669 
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DISCLAIMER 670 
The study was undertaken by ML, AG and TR in their personal capacities. The opinions 671 
expressed in this article are the authors own and do not reflect the view of the participating 672 
organisation. 673 
 674 
KEY POINTS 675 
 Near miss incident analysis adds significant value to understanding how error is 676 
captured on the financial trading floor 677 
 Human factors problems underlying error and the skills used to prevent error from 678 
escalating in the financial trading domain can be reliably identified and extracted by 679 
trained experts using the Financial Incident Analysis System (FINANS) 680 
 Overwhelmingly, error is detected and prevented by teamwork skills (65%) and 681 
situation awareness (46%).  682 
 Associative analysis reveals that teamwork and situation awareness are the most 683 
likely to occur together doing so in just under half (45%) of all near miss where 684 
situation awareness prevented a near miss. Meaning that regardless of the cause of the 685 
error, situation awareness and teamwork are the leading skills used to capture and 686 
prevent error.  687 
 Our research provides novel evidence that data from incident monitoring systems can 688 
be analysed in a fashion more consistent with a safety II approach (i.e. identify good 689 
practice for mitigating, rather than reducing, error). 690 
 691 
 692 
 693 
 694 
 695 
 696 
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 698 
 699 
 700 
 701 
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